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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3457 
 ___________ 
 
 BENJAMIN MONTERROSO-MORALES, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A088-231-074) 
 Immigration Judge: Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 25, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Benjamin Monterroso-Morales petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals‟ (“BIA” or “Board”) final order of removal.  The Government has filed a motion 
to dismiss the petition for review.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss it for lack 
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of subject matter jurisdiction. 
I. 
 Monterroso-Morales, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States 
without inspection in October 1995.  In 2007, the Government charged him with 
removability for being in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.  
Monterroso-Morales admitted the charge and sought cancellation of removal under 
Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240A(b)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)]1, arguing 
that his removal would work an “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship on his two 
United States citizen daughters. 
  The IJ denied Monterroso-Morales‟ application.  She determined that although he 
had established the requisite period of physical presence in the United States and good 
moral character during that period, he failed to establish exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to his minor daughters, who will remain in the United States after he is 
removed.  The BIA dismissed Monterroso-Morales‟ subsequent appeal and he filed a 
timely petition for review in this Court. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review final BIA orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  But 
                                                 
 
1
 This provision provides, in relevant part, that the Attorney General may cancel 
the removal of an alien who was continuously present in the United States for at least ten 
years before applying, who is of good character, who has not committed certain crimes, 
and who has established that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to the alien‟s spouse, parent, or child, who is a permanent resident or citizen of 
the United States.  See INA § 240A(b)(1). 
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as the parties recognize, that jurisdiction is restricted by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), 
which limits judicial review of discretionary agency actions.  Mendez-Moranchel v. 
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003); Patel v. Att‟y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions made pursuant to  
8 U.S.C. § 1229b, including „exceptional and extremely unusual‟ hardship 
determinations.”).  However, we may still review colorable constitutional claims or 
questions of law.  Patel, 619 F.3d at 232.  Dressing a fundamentally discretionary claim 
in legal clothing does not grant jurisdiction that would otherwise be proscribed.  Pareja v. 
Att‟y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Monterroso-Morales argues that the agency erroneously required him to meet a 
higher standard of hardship to his daughters by committing the following legal errors: 1) 
failing to consider the educational hardship that his older daughter will suffer if he is 
removed to Guatemala; 2) failing to consider the “cumulative effect” of the hardship 
faced by his daughters; and 3) improperly relying on Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) to evaluate the circumstances of his case.  See Petitioner‟s 
Brief (“Pet. Br.”) at 14-21.  Monterroso-Morales contends that because of these errors, 
the IJ and BIA essentially required him to establish that his daughters would face 
“unconscionable hardship,” a standard that is higher than “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship.”  Id. at 19-21. 
 We have reviewed Monterroso-Morales‟ first two arguments and conclude that his 
contentions “amount to nothing more than quarrels over the exercise of discretion and the 
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correctness of the factual findings reached by the agency.”  See Cospito v. Att‟y Gen., 
539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (addressing arguments that IJ, inter alia, “gave „short 
shrift to crucial evidence‟” and “„simply looked at individual factors‟ rather than provide 
an evaluation of the factors in the aggregate”) (citation omitted).2  Accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider them.  See id. at 171. 
 Next, Monterroso-Morales argues that the agency‟s “reliance” on Matter of 
Monreal-Aguinaga is “misplaced.”  Pet. Br. at 17.  Specifically, he contends that the IJ 
failed to recognize distinctions between his circumstances and those presented in that 
case.  A review of  Monterroso-Morales‟ briefing demonstrates that he is merely asserting 
that he met his burden of showing an exceptional hardship.  As we indicated earlier, we 
lack jurisdiction to review a fundamentally discretionary claim dressed in legal clothing.  
Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186-87. 
 Monterroso-Morales claims that the because the agency‟s committed the 
aforementioned legal errors, it effectively required a heightened showing of an 
“unconscionable hardship” to his daughters.  Pet. Br. at 18-19.  However, as we have 
explained, we lack jurisdiction to review those claims.  Moreover, there is no evidence 
                                                 
 
2
 We nevertheless note that the IJ expressly considered the evidence in the 
aggregate.  (See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 30-31.)  Also, contrary to 
Monterroso-Morales‟ assertion, both the IJ and BIA examined his testimony regarding 
the health, educational, and emotional impact that his removal will have on his daughters, 
but concluded that he was unable to meet the standard of “exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship.”  (Id. at 3, 23-25, 28-31.)  Indeed, the BIA “„is not required to write an 
exegesis on every contention,‟ . . . but only to show that it has reviewed the record and 
grasped the movant‟s claims.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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that the IJ or Board applied anything other than the exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship standard.  Indeed, both stated the correct legal standard in their decisions.  (A.R. 
at 3, 30.)  Because Monterroso-Morales has not presented a colorable legal or 
constitutional challenge, we must dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
 Lastly, Monterroso-Morales argues that the agency violated his due process rights 
when it denied his application for cancellation of removal.  Pet. Br. at 21-24.  
Monterroso-Morales‟ due process claim is based on the same arguments that he raised as 
questions of law.  As we have stated, those claims fall outside of our jurisdiction and, 
thus his due process challenge is dismissed for the same reasons. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will grant the Government‟s motion and dismiss the 
petition for review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
